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“Withoud God: Gravity as a relational propert in Newton’s Treatise:”​[1]​

I: Introduction & Thesis

In this paper I interpret Newton’s speculative treatment of gravity as a relational, accidental property of matter that arises through what Newton calls “the shared action” of two bodies of matter. In doing so, I expand and extend on a hint by Howard Stein. However, in developing the details of my interpretation I end up disagreeing with Stein’s claim that for Newton a single body can generate a gravity/force field. 

I argue that when Newton drafted the first edition of the Principia in the mid 1680s, he thought that (at least a part of) the cause of gravity is the disposition inherent in any individual body, but that the force of gravity is the actualization of that disposition; a necessary condition for the actualization of the disposition is the actual obtaining of a relation between two bodies having  the disposition. The cause of gravity is not essential to matter because God could have created matter without that disposition. Nevertheless, at least a part of the cause of gravity inheres in individual bodies and were there one body in the universe it would inhere in that body. On the other hand, the force of gravity is neither essential to matter nor inherent in matter, because (to repeat) it is the actualization of a shared disposition. A lone part-less particle would, thus, not generate a gravity field. 

Seeing this allows us to helpfully distinguish among a) accepting gravity as causally real; b) the cause(s) (e.g. the qualities of matter) of the properties of gravity; c) making claims about the mechanism or medium by which gravity is transmitted. This will help clarify what Newton could have meant when he insisted that gravity is a real force. I present my argument in opposition to Andrew Janiak’s influential and fine 2007 paper. Along the way, I call attention to my disagreement with Janiak on a number of secondary issues (e.g. Janiak’s attribution to Newton of a distinction between ‘local’ and ‘distant’ action; Janiak’s reading of the “Letter to Bentley,” etc). 

The view I attribute to Newton is the view that he held when writing the first edition of the Principia in the mid 1680s. My evidence for this is a translation of the first draft of Book III of the Principia that appeared in English as A Treatise of the System of the World.​[2]​ I know of no reason to deny that this account was written during the mid 1680s as Newton was moving from the successive drafts deposited with the Royal Society, known as De Motu, and the publication of the first edition of the Principia. There are, thus, two reasons to take it very seriously. 

First, it gives us insight into Newton’s thinking while he was working out the details of his system. In the published introduction to Book III of the Principia, Newton said he suppressed his Treatise in order to “prevent the disputes” with others’ “prejudices.” I believe the prejudices he has in mind are not merely ‘vulgar,’ but rather philosophical, that is, those in circulation among the learned. For, the Treatise is more speculatively metaphysical than the published version of Book III. Nevertheless, because of the timing of its writing and the fact that Newton clearly did not disown it, it is rather surprising that it has been largely neglected in Newton scholarship. While many later much studied additions to the Principia can be explained by Newton’s response to new empirical evidence or corrections to obvious problems, these should be viewed as Newton’s evolving response to the concerns expressed by some of his religiously motivated interlocutors and the evolving polemics with Leibniz and his followers. It is a bit strange that the General Scholium and, say, the Letter to Bentley have received a lot more attention than the Treatise among those who claim to be interested in Newton’s metaphysics; surely in uncovering Newton’s substantive commitments, we should not focus primarily on the views he expressed for reasons associated with what I call the “Socratic problem,” that is, the independent authority of philosophy in the face of social, political, and religious constraints. With Newton’s general secrecy and flirtations with Arianism, there is no denying his awareness of such constraints; in ‘DeGrav’ he calls attention to how Descartes “feared” (25) positions that might be thought as offering “a path to atheism” (31).

Second, because the Treatise was published so shortly after Newton’s death it is invaluable in making us understand the reception of Newton in the eighteenth century. While that reception was shaped by the Opticks, the Leibniz-Clark correspondence and Newtonian popularizes, the Treatise’s influence is much neglected. This is unfortunate. For example, David Hume claimed that “It was never the meaning of Sir ISAAC NEWTON to rob second causes of all force or energy; though some of his followers have endeavoured to establish that theory upon his authority” (footnote at the end of EHU 7.1.25: a note on Hume's Terminology: God is the “first cause;” “second causes” are ordinary finite causes that operate in nature, e.g. laws of nature, or certain species of powers). Among Newton scholars it is becoming unfashionable to read Newton as an instrumentalist or positivist, but many probably still read the eighteenth century British Empiricists as reading Newton in this (mistaken) way and, thus, uninformative on matters of Newton interpretation. Moreover, scholars are, thus, also blind to the fact that British Empiricists are often very ambivalent about the new role of Newton’s “authority.” So while today I do not hope to rehabilitate eighteenth century British thought as a guide to interpreting Newton (that must be left for another time), it is useful to realize that we do not need to focus exclusively on Huygens, Leibniz, and Kant in offering philosophical insight into Newton’s thought. 

Moreover, once we realize that many Empiricists understood Newton as a kind of realist of the sort they were not, we can also see that part of the great eighteenth century debate in philosophy is not between Empiricism and Rationalism, but between those philosophers that believe in creating complete systems from the method of inspecting ideas (think Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, and Hume) and those that believe in a more piece-meal mathematical-experimental approach a tradition initiated by Galileo and Huygens. The Newton of DeGrav, which is now the focus of so much scholarly attention, who unabashedly offers an analysis of the “exceptionally clear idea of extension” (Janiak, 2004, 22; see also 27) belongs to the first tradition; the Newton of the Principia and the Treatise is the champion of the second tradition. (Of course, Newton mentions our “ideas of [God’s] attributes,” but his argument is not based on an inspection of those ideas.) If I am right about this, we should date DeGrav before the Treatise (a claim that is plausible on other grounds, too).

While the view I attribute to Newton should be a privileged one, for present purposes, I provide five methodological/historiographic reasons to remain agnostic both on how this view should be fully squared with other, potentially competing proposals that Newton entertained on such matters (for example, the role and nature of God or a very subtle ether in supplying the mechanism for attraction) as well as on the issue if Newton offered a stable and consistent position throughout his life. First, Newton’s manuscripts reveal a man who was willing to entertain and try out many ideas, although when such views find their way into print without solid empirical evidence they tended to be segregated in ‘scholia,’ ‘queries,’ ‘letters,’ and the views presented by his various followers. Second, without full consideration of his alchemical, political, and religious views at any moment, I despair of discerning a comprehensive view of Newton’s speculative metaphysics even at that time. Some day this may be possible. Third, because of the dangerous political and complicated religious context we cannot always take Newton at face value in speculative matters, especially because there are instances when Newton hints at his knowledge of an esoteric/exoteric distinction. Fourth, despite a few notable and isolated exceptions, we do not have a comprehensive view of how Newton’s views evolved across and among many issues. It is dangerous to treat of any of Newton’s speculative views in isolation, but it’s not always clear how to fit these to a larger evolving package. Finally, Newton is an extraordinarily terse writer, and sometimes lesser mortals like us could have used further clarification. In fact, these considerations have hitherto inclined me to restrict my scholarship to the reception of Newton’s views. So, despite the firm language in what follows, my views are very provisional.

In this paper, I proceed as follows: first, I present the view as I find it in Newton’s posthumously published Treatise (section II). I explain how Newton offers a relational account of gravity. I often contrast my view with Andrew Janiak’s influential essay (2007), especially his reading of Newton’s famous Letter to Bentley as ruling out action at a distance (Section III). In the fourth section, I disagree with Howard Stein’s account of how the gravity field is generated by a particle; I argue that a lone particle is not enough to generate a force field. In offering arguments against Stein’s view, I take strong interpretive stances on the third rule of reasoning and the third law of motion with its corollaries. 

Section II: Gravity as a Relational Quality of Matter

In his essay, “Newton and the Reality of Force,” (JHP, vol. 45, no. 1 (2007) 127–147), Janiak ably demonstrates that Newton thought that a force of gravity “really exists” (130, 141; Janiak quoting the Principia’s “General Scholium”) because it is one of “the causes which distinguish true motions from relative motions” by way of the “forces impressed upon bodies” (Principia, 412; quoted in Janiak 134, note 17; see also pages 130-1, 143-6). Following in the footsteps of Leibniz, Janiak correctly rejects an instrumentalist reading of Newton’s views on gravity (138ff).​[3]​ 

Because many philosophers are introduced to Newton’s views through Clarke’s correspondence with Leibniz and have found Clarke’s arguments wanting on a range of issues, they have been prevented from treating Newton as a serious philosopher. There is, thus, no doubt that Janiak’s paper should encourage a re-evaluation of Newton’s substantive philosophy on a host of issues. Janiak’s publications will surely be one of the first scholarly stops along the way.​[4]​ By relying nearly exclusively on Newton’s publications and letters Newton wrote to contemporaries, Janiak shows that much of Newton’s philosophical views can be gleaned from Newton’s published writings if they are read with attention. Newton is often a terse writer, but not obscure. While Newton’s unpublished manuscripts on theology and alchemy are fascinating and often provide very helpful context, we need not defer to these to grasp some of the most important strands of Newton’s views. This is especially useful if we wish to explore Newton’s impact on philosophy because nearly all these unpublished manuscripts were unavailable to many other influential and insightful readers of Newton in much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (and thereafter).

One of the most important of Janiak’s insights is his claim against Leibniz that “if by ‘mechanism’ one means a natural phenomenon that acts only on the surfaces of other bodies, then Newton rejects the claim that gravity must have some underlying mechanism on the grounds that gravity acts not on the surfaces of bodies, but rather on all the parts of a body (Newton, Principia, 943)” (Janiak 129, note 6). Because “mass is one of the salient variables in the causal chain involving the previously disparate phenomena taken by Newton to be caused by gravity …[and therefore] gravity is not a mechanical cause” (Janiak 142, see also 145), Newton rejects a key demand of the Mechanical philosophy (146-7).​[5]​ 

Nevertheless, in following Leibniz’s lead in reading Newton, Janiak ends up misdiagnosing some very important elements of Newton’s metaphysics. In particular, Janiak ignores the original draft of “Book II” [sic] of the Principia, which was published first in Latin (1728) and shortly thereafter (1728, 1731) in two English translations as A Treatise of the System of the World (hereafter Treatise) shortly after Newton’s death (1727) and was, thus, available to most of Newton’s early readers.​[6]​ This is important because Janiak tacitly attributes to Newton (and the Principia) an a-historical stable position without arguing for it. Focus on the Treatise, prevents us from ruling out in advance a developmental approach to Newton.​[7]​ In particular, here I am committed to the position that we should be open to allowing Newton to have developed his views between the first and third edition of the Principia (and the intervening editions of the Optics), although this plays no role in my argument.

Concerning the view I attribute to Newton, Newton knows that it is a kind of speculative metaphysics or hypothesis that he deplores with increasing vehemence in others as he anticipates and gets embroiled in debates with the Mechanical philosophers and later the vituperative, politicized exchanges with Leibniz and his followers. As Newton becomes ever more insistent on the “empirical” and “experimental” nature of his method,​[8]​ he, thus, deprives himself from developing and articulating fully the speculative view that guided his early development of his views in the first edition of the Principia. Moreover, Newton had a certain amount of self-command in refraining from publicly pursuing certain questions (which we know fascinated him). On my reading it follows that he came to devalue the kind of metaphysical interpretation I am about to engage in. Elsewhere, I have called attention to what I call “Newton’s Challenge” in which the independent authority of philosophy is challenged by empirical science. Newton’s intended and unintended role in generating a world in which science and philosophy became competitors is complex matter, and I cannot do justice to it here.​[9]​ One symptom of this separation of philosophy and science is – as the leading Newtonian of the first half of eighteenth century, Colin MacLaurin, recognized,​[10]​ that against systematizing philosophers, Newton and his followers were willing to pursue more narrow research questions. Newton’s achievement is to create a mathematical, theoretical structure that was highly promising and efficient as a research engine for ever more informative measurement at the expense of settling certain metaphysical matters.  

In A Treatise Newton offers a distinction between a mathematical and natural point of view:​[11]​ “We may consider one body as attracting, another as attracted: But this distinction is more mathematical than natural.” Here, as in the “technical” contrast between the “mathematical” and “physical” of the Principia (Janiak 2007, 131ff),​[12]​ Newton does not deny the reality of the natural point of view. For Newton goes on to write “the attraction is really common of either [body] to [an]other” (Treatise, 37). Newton is alerting his readers to the fact that one cannot simply infer ontology from one’s mathematical expression. In the Treatise’s next paragraph, Newton explains the “natural” perspective more fully, specifically, in terms of the attraction between Jupiter and the Sun. I quote two passages. 

The first one reads, “There is a double cause of action, to wit, the disposition of each body.” The action is likewise twofold “in so far as the action is considered as upon two bodies; But as betwixt two bodies it is but one sole single one” (38). The second reads: “We are to conceive a single action to be exerted betwixt two Planets, arising from the conspiring nature of both” (39).​[13]​

In order to get the conception of the nature of an interaction, at work in Newton we must note the difference between 1) the “cause of the action” — this is “the disposition of each body” and 2) the “action” (or effect) itself.  The action is i) twofold as it is upon two bodies, and ii) single as between two bodies. A way to capture this is to say that a body has two dispositions: a ‘passive’ disposition to respond to impressed forces is codified in the second law of motion whereas an ‘active’ disposition to produce gravitational force is treated as a distinct interaction codified in the third law of motion.​[14]​ Thus, we see that the “cause” of the action is “the conspiring nature of both” bodies. For the “conspiring” to occur, the bodies must share a “nature.” To sum up: the cause consists in the “nature” or “disposition” of two bodies (or a twofold cause because involving two bodies), but it is one interaction or “nature.” (For my argument below it is useful that Newton thinks of the interaction itself as a ‘nature.’)​[15]​ What are caused are one interaction and two “actions upon bodies;” there are two impressed forces. As Howard Stein explains (while using somewhat anachronistic language), “exactly those bodies that are susceptible to the action of a given interaction-field are also the sources of the field.”​[16]​

As Andrew Janiak noted, “Part of Newton's point here is to say that the third law holds for “attractions,” just as it holds for other interactions, and to note that the "attraction" between the bodies in question is proportional to the mass of each body” (private correspondence, 11/3/06). Janiak and I agree about this much. But Janiak underestimates that Newton is offering us a radical new idea, one that he feared would encounter a lot of prejudice; here we have on offer a speculative hypothesis about the nature of matter. First, Newton emphasizes a single "action" between two bodies. (He uses the repeated "actio" in Latin.) This is, thus, a very clear description of action at a distance; applying the third law of motion is not merely mathematical statement, but action at a distance really takes place in nature. Janiak would agree with me that this reflects “Newton's contention in the Principia’s “General Scholium” that gravitas revera existat.” In the Treatise, Newton explains that this is due to a shared quality of two bits of matter; that is, Newton is hypothesizing the underlying part of the physical cause. Somewhat paradoxically, according to Newton the body with a ‘passive’ disposition to be attracted is part of the cause of the gravitational force. Newton’s genius is that instead of untangling this knot, he focuses on defining measures of the gravitational force. Here Newton is silent, however, whether or not this attraction is mediated through a medium. 

So, we should distinguish among a) the force of gravity as a real cause (which is calculated as the product of the masses over the distance squared); b) the cause of gravity (which is at least, in part, the masses to be found in each body); b*) “the reason for these [particular--ES] properties of gravity” (Newton in “General Scholium,” Principia, quoted in his own translation by Janiak, 129), and c) the medium, if any, through which it is transmitted.​[17]​ So, the view presented here by Newton takes a complete stance on ‘a’ and a partial stance on ‘b,’ but is silent on ‘b*’. In the Treatise, Newton is entirely silent on ‘c,’ the invisible medium, if any, to explain in what way momentum could be exchanged between two bodies. Given that he uses the language of ‘action’ and is completely silent on the possibility of a medium of transmission, the natural reading of this passage is I) Newton’s endorsement of action at a distance with II) the start of an explanation of the cause of gravity in terms of some of the qualities of matter. But instead of being distracted by the incomplete nature of explanation, Newton oriented natural philosophy toward a sophisticated program of piece-meal problem solving through measurement.

Now Janiak (137) quotes Leibniz’s last letter to Clarke: “For it is a strange fiction…to make all matter gravitate, and that toward all other matter, as if all bodies equally attract all other bodies according to their masses and distances, and this by an attraction properly so called…, which is not derived from an occult impulse of bodies, whereas the gravity of sensible bodies toward the center of the earth ought to be produced by the motion of some fluid.”​[18]​ I agree with Leibniz (and against Janiak, 141) that Newton really endorsed the “strange fiction,” and I reject Janiak’s apparent willingness to accept Leibniz’s insistence (against the fiction) that a motion of some fluid must be the “cause” of gravity. Thus, while Janiak criticizes Leibniz’s argument against Newton, throughout his article, Janiak conflates i) treating of the mechanism or medium by which gravity is transmitted with ii) treating of the cause of the gravitational qualities of matter (see also Janiak, 136); while outside the Principia, Newton can sometimes be read this way, it appears that Leibniz is the source of Janiak’s conflation.

Before I note some obvious objections to my Treatise inspired interpretation of Newton, I spell out three implications of the view I attribute to Newton. First, it treats gravity (understood as a causally real force) as itself ‘produced’ by a relational quality of matter. It’s only because of matter’s special relationship to other parts of matter that it gravitates. That is, we “need a pair of bodies for both the ‘active’ and ‘passive’ aspects of the disposition to gravitate to be in play; it is only with the pair that the ‘active’ disposition to produce force combined with the ‘passive’ disposition to respond causes an interaction that yields actual motions” (Smeenk, personal correspondence, 5/23/2008).

Second, gravity is, thus, not an intrinsic quality of single bit of matter. The relation only holds between bits of matter, which are said to share a ‘nature,’ that is, a ‘disposition’ to gravitate when conjoined.’​[19]​ So, on my view gravity is intrinsic to the relation, a ‘nature,’ but not to matter itself. For those disinclined a priori to believe that Newton would hold such a position, it might help to note that this dispositional, relational account is analogous to a claim made in terms of capacities in “De Gravitatione:” “for when the accidents of bodies have been rejected, there remains not extension alone, as [Descartes] supposed, but also the capacities by which they can stimulate perceptions in the mind” (Newton 2004: 35). A lone particle in the universe will not stimulate a perception until there is a mind present. (Of course, the official argument goes in the other direction: the description of corporeal nature is “deduced…from our faculty of moving our bodies!” (30))

Because gravity is not an intrinsic quality of a particle of matter, we can grasp why for Newton gravity is not essential to matter. John Henry has argued that this is due to Newton’s commitment to God super-adding gravity to matter.​[20]​ My view cannot rule out this possibility, and Newton was probably eager to encourage it among certain of his more orthodox interlocutors such as Bentley. However, I read Newton as claiming in the Treatise that gravity is not “inherent” in matter by, say, God’s super-addition, but rather generated by (for lack of a better term) the interaction between at minimum two bits of matter due to their shared nature, that is, mass. Now, as Ori Belkind has reminded me, the shared mass of the two particles is reducible to the distinct masses that each object possess separately, and this may be thought to make gravity an inherent property; or, given that mass is not a relational quality, one can have the cause of gravity defined non-relationally, and gravity itself defined relationally. But it is only in virtue of the masses entering into an ‘interaction’ that they ‘produce’ gravity. Thus, even after creation, a lonely part-less particle of matter in the universe would not be said to gravitate. The disposition is only actualized when the universe contains at least two bodies. So, first, when it comes to gravity, we are dealing with a relational and inessential property of matter. Second, even while we can think of ‘part’ of the ‘cause’ of gravity, mass, as intrinsic to matter, it only ‘is’ a cause when related to other masses.​[21]​  

My reading has seven nice features associated with it. First, while it is a species of speculative metaphysics that Newton increasingly came to deplore, it provides an account of part of the physical cause of gravity in an ontologically sparse way in accord with Newton’s first rule of reasoning.​[22]​ No new entities are introduced. Of course, the downside is that surprising and strange qualities are attributed to known entities. Thus, second, it accords with the ontological priority of matter over the laws of nature in Newton’s late cosmological query that “it may be also allowed that God is able to create particles of matter of several sizes and figures, and in several proportions to space, and perhaps of different densities and forces, and thereby to vary the laws of nature, and made worlds of several sorts in several parts of the universe” (Query 31, Optics 403-4; emphasis added). It is the relationships among the densities and forces of matter to space that accounts for the varying laws and worlds. 

Third, related to these, is an additional attractive feature: it is theologically neutral. Newton leaves room for a possible role for God (for example, as the medium, or as cause of the world), but he is not required to commit to it. Newton writes in a different context in Optics, Query 31, it only “seems probable to [Newton] that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties, and in such proportion to space” (400). 

Fourth, this probabilistic and empirical approach to matters related to our knowledge of God’s attributes, which are treated “from phenomena” fits the overall character of the Treatise, where God shows up only once (and then very briefly) in the antecedent of a conditional statement about the placement of the planetary orbits (33).​[23]​ It even fits the more theologically ambitious picture of “De Gravitatione,” where Newton’s treatment of the idea of space is compatible with the claim that it is merely a) “as it were an emanative effect of God” (21) and b) “an emanative effect of the first existing being” (25) as well as c) “the emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being” (26); while the reader is invited to think of God as the first cause, all three versions are compatible with a theistic and pantheistic interpretation. Regardless of Newton’s private commitments, in public he is nearly always careful not to overstep the evidence.

Fifth, gravity is not essential to matter because not only can we conceive that God would initially create matter without gravity, but also – and more importantly, Newton writes (in a passage also quoted by Janiak) in his comment on the Third Rule of Reasoning, “I am by no means affirming that gravity is essential to bodies . . . Gravity is diminished as bodies recede from the earth” (added to the third edition of the Principia, 796). That is, it is an empirical discovery that the strength of gravity can vary with distance. The value of gravitational mass does not vary, what varies is the strength of the interaction. A way to make sense of Newton’s denial of having claimed that gravity is essential to bodies, is to argue that gravity follows from a relation. Against Janiak I see no textual evidence that Newton ever equated “attraction at a distance” with the claim that gravity is “essential” to body (128, note 5 to be quoted below in full).​[24]​ I also see no evidence that Newton equated gravity being “essential” to matter to it being “inherent” in matter (128, note 5). To be an “essential” quality just means being a quality that is required for (or a necessary condition of) the existence of matter, while gravity being “inherent” says something about its “seat” (Principia, 407), that is, its location. McGuire puts this point nicely: “For Newton, a body can be a body without acting gravitationally” (personal correspondence, 5/10/2008). Of course were one to determine that gravity is an essential quality of body, one would also be inclined to claim it inheres in it. But it is true that Newton’s third rule also asserts that while gravity is not essential to (in the sense of not a necessary condition to the existence of) bodies being bodies (bodies could have been arranged otherwise) it is, until we find contrary phenomenon, a universal, empirical fact that gravity is not separable from pairs/systems of bodies. 

Sixth, Newton is committed to the position that “the various phenomena caused by gravity are such that mass and distance are the only known salient “variables in the causal chain that involves them. We express this precisely through the law of universal gravitation, asserting that gravity is as the masses of the objects in question and is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them” (Janiak, 142). Janiak is surely correct to emphasize that Newton’s mathematical account places constraints on what a physical account should look like because our goal is to supplement not replace the mathematical account (136). But Janiak ignores that Newton is also in position to distinguish conceptually between investigating the material cause of gravity and the medium that facilitates the interaction. We can learn things about the nature of matter, mass, without learning anything about the medium. In fact, given that post Principia the medium must have neglible mass, one should say that it has an entirely different ‘nature’ than matter. 

Seventh, it avoids attributing to Newton the “absurd” Epicurean position in which passive matter can act at a distance; this is clearly rejected in the Letter to Bentley.​[25]​ But it does not follow from this, as Janiak contends, that Newton rules out action at a distance tout court. For, Newton’s position in the Letter to Bentley permits us to understand that in the right circumstances matter can be viewed as ‘active.’​[26]​ This is, in fact, what Newton indicates in Query 31, where he contrasts the “passive principle by which the bodies persist in their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted” with “active principles, such as are the cause of gravity, by which planets and comets keep their motions in their orbits, and bodies acquire great motion in falling; and the cause of fermentation,” and so on. Shortly thereafter, he lists “gravity, and that which causes fermentation, and the cohesion of bodies” among the “active principles” (Optics, 400-1). This allows that (as he explicitly says in his Letter to Bentley) that the attractive “agent be material.” I should emphasize that on my position Newton neither asserts that matter is altogether active or passive.​[27]​ It depends on the way we are conceiving things.
 
Incidentally, because the laws of motion are also said to be “passive” (and in virtue of the ontological priority of matter over laws, noted in my second point above) , I reject as un-Newtonian Fatio’s late (1705) speculation that gravity is “an immediate effect of the will of God, and one of the first rules by which he controls the universe…it is not impossible nor even out of probability, that God, by a law, established that matter attracts itself mutually, with a force proportional to its mass and reciprocal with the square of the distance.”​[28]​ If God is involved in accounting for action at a distance, it will be in the way he created matter.

Thus, I reject Janiak’s claim “Newton considered any non-local action to be simply “inconceivable” (144) on two grounds: first Janiak misidentifies what is “inconceivable” according to Newton in the “Letter to Bentley;” second Janiak is relying on a distinction between ‘local’ versus ‘distant’ action (145) that is not to be found in Newton. Let me turn to details of Janiak’s arguments next.

III: On the conceivability of local and distant action 

Because my reading of the Letter to Bentley conflicts with Janiak’s and this ramifies through our approaches to Newton, I quote Janiak at length before I criticize the details of his argument. Janiak writes that Newton “wrote to Bentley in 1693, six years after the Principia first appeared: 
“It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact . . . That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.5”​[29]​
Janiak comments on this that Newton, thus, “forcefully” rejects “the very idea of action at a distance.” (128) In using this passage to motivate his reading of both Newton’s rejection of distant action between matter as well as Newton’s search for properties of a medium, Janiak finds himself in excellent company of Maxwell, who also uses it to carefully distinguishes between Cotes’ attribution of “direct” distant action and Newton’s position.​[30]​

But Janiak (and even Maxwell!) quotes the passage selectively. Janiak leaves out the crucial point of the passage, that is, Newton’s denial that he is Epicurean!​[31]​ The full passage reads: 

“It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must do if gravitation, in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it And this is one reason why I desired you would not ascribe innate gravity to me. That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial I have left to the consideration of my reader” (quoted from Janiak’s edition of Newton’s Philosophical Writings, 102).
By contrast, my preferred reading of the letter to Bentley is that it is “inconceivable” that "inanimate brute” matter can produce action at a distance (especially) if we conceive gravity along Epicurean lines, that is, as innate, essential and inherent to matter. But this entirely allows other conceptions of matter with more 'active' properties (and other conceptions of gravity). The last sentence of the “Letter to Bentley” quoted above qualifies the absolutist-denial of action-at-a-distance reading offered by Maxwell and Janiak. There Newton says that he will leave it to the reader to decide if gravity is "caused" by a “material or immaterial” "agent!"  All of this means that Newton does not rule out the existence of (properly reconceived) matter as an active agent or cause of gravity. It would, of course, be a contradiction in terms for “passive” matter to be an “agent;” but Newton never claims in his own voice that matter must always be passive. (Recall my treatment of active/passive principles above.) Newton did consistently deny that 'mere mechanical' causes or “necessity” (Newton 2004, 57) or “blind fate” (Newton 2004, 137) can explain the universe. Newton wants to avoid being read as an Epicurean or Hobbesian. It is surprising that Janiak misses this concern. For, in the fifth reply to Leibniz, which plays a crucial role in Janiak’s argument, Clarke forcefully rejects Leibniz’s attempts to tag Newton as an Epicurean (§128-130).

Unfortunately, Janiak uses his reading of the “Letter to Bentley” to attribute to Newton the view that action at a distance is inconceivable and, thus, that Newton relies on a (tacit) distinction between (inconceivable) distant and (conceivable) local action (e.g. “all action between material bodies must be local—on pain of there being an “inconceivable” distant action,” 143; see also 141). According to Janiak, local action “is any causal interaction that does not occur at a spatial distance” (private correspondence, 4/28/2008). I find no evidence in Newton for this position. To be clear, in his analysis of ‘local’ action, Janiak (143) is careful to distinguish Leibniz’s restrictive position, which only permits surface action (which is any causal interaction that involves the surfaces of two or more bodies), from a less stringent version (gravity may involve some kind of medium that does not act on the surface of bodies, but somehow penetrates them) that Janiak attributes to Newton. In his paper (143), Janiak correctly cites Newton’s Query 28 as rejecting the Leibnizian hypothesis. But Janiak also appears to cite Newton’s Query 21 as illustrating his claim that Newton is tacitly relying on a local/distant action distinction. But unfortunately, most such claims by Janiak presuppose his further claim that Newton thinks distant action is inconceivable.​[32]​ Equally unpromising is Janiak’s argument that goes from Newton’s explicit denial of gravity being essential to gravity to attributing to Newton a denial of action at a distance. As noted above, to deny that gravity is essential to matter is just to deny that gravity is necessary condition to the existence of a lone, part-less particle, or one of the primary qualities of matter. But I have argued against such a view: Newton is committed to gravity being a relational quality.  
 
Section IV: on the nature of the force​[33]​

My position does come into conflict with an alternative, influential reading of Newton. Howard Stein’s ‘field’ interpretation of gravity was initially and influentially offered as an interpretation of Newton’s example in the treatment of Definition 8 of the Principia, where Newton writes that “accelerative force [may be referred to], the place of the body as a certain efficacy diffused from the center through each of the surrounding places in order to move the bodies that are in those places; and the absolute force [may be referred], to the center as having some cause without which the motive forces are not propagated through the surrounding regions, whether this cause is some central body (such as the lodestone in the center of a magnetic force or the earth in the center of a force that produces gravity” or whether it is some other cause which is not apparent.” Note, by the way, that Newton distinguishes the cause of the force and it in turn from gravity, offering independent support for my claim above not to conflate such matters. Given that Stein was my original source to treat the Treatise passage authoritatively, I conclude by briefly distinguishing my view from Stein’s.

Stein treats Definition 8 as claiming that a single particle generates a force field in the places around it.​[34]​ But this does injustice to the fact that according to Newton it is the ‘shared nature’ that generates the inverse-square force. So, on my view it is only a pair of bodies that generates anything. My dispute with Stein turns on how to interpret Newton’s empirical approach especially in terms of the i) the exact wording of the explanation of Definition 8; ii) as formulated in the third rule of reasoning and iii) perhaps on one’s sense of Newton’s aesthetics. Let me explain these three differences, and offer responses to Stein’s arguments. 

In arguing for his field interpretation, Stein is committed to the claim that bodies generate a gravity field around them even in places where there are no other bodies. Against Stein, I argue, first, that in Definition 8, Newton does not claim that there would be an accelerative force or an accelerative measure of a gravitational force in the absence of a second body;  rather the definition of accelerative forces is given in terms the disposition of a central body to “move the bodies that are in” the surrounding places. Thus, the example following Definition 8 is quite clear that we are dealing with an interaction (or shared action). The example provides, as Ori Belkind writes, “evidence for the fact that Newton distinguished between the cause of gravity (the masses of bodies) and the force of gravity is the distinction between the absolute, accelerative and motive measures of the force. The absolute measure of the force is associated with the cause of the force, located inherently in the body at the center of attraction. The accelerative and motive measures can be relational” (Belkind, private correspondence, 5/4/2008). Moreover, the whole example of Definition 8 is about weight; that is, Newton is giving a treatment of forces not in terms of their (counterfactual) impact on empty places but on places filled with matter. This fits nicely with my emphasis above on the ontological priority of matter. 

Second, on my reading of the third Rule of Reasoning, we can infer universally that pairs or systems of bodies, or shared actions, generate forces where bodies are, but no more.​[35]​ We have no empirical evidence whatsoever on how to think about a lone part-less particle. In fact, Rule 3 and Newton’s explication of it is articulated in terms of the plural “bodies” and their plural “parts.” (Recall: Those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted and that belong to all bodies on which experiments can be made should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally.”) The only lone body mentioned in the long discussion accompanying rule three is a hypothetical disconfirming divisible body, but this is unrelated to the universal nature of gravity and (thus) evidence for my approach. 

Finally, my whole approach makes sense of the fact that Newton’s earliest and most able readers, including Leibniz, found even the cleansed view of the Principia unabashedly occult. A reading of Newton that makes him out to appear plausibly as a certain kind of innovative scholastic should, thus, have something to be said for it, especially because we are also trying to explain why he would have suppressed it in light of expected prejudices. It is to be admitted that on my view of Newton the infinite universe is populated by infinite number of pairs or systems of interactions within and among bodies generating infinite number of attractions. But that is no stranger than the mere fact of universal attraction. Newton is leading us to this view when he writes in his account of the third rule of reasoning: “if it is universally established by experiments and astronomical observations that all bodies on or near the earth are heavy towards the earth, and do so in proportion to the quantity of matter in each body, and that the moon is heavy toward the earth in proportion to the quantity of its and matter, and that our sea in turn is heavy towards the moon, and that all planets are heavy toward one another, and that there is a similar heaviness, of comets toward the sun, it will have to be concluded by this third rule that all bodies gravitate toward one another.” 





Let me end with two disconnected observations. In my treatment I have said nothing about a very important and much neglected passage (Book 1, Section 11, Scholium): “finally, it will be possible to argue more securely concerning the physical species, physical causes, and physical proportions of these forces" (p 588 in Cohen translation; emphasis added). By talking about the conspiring nature of matter, my treatment of the Treatise has at least started an interpretation of what Newton thought the physical causes were and what species they belonged to. But this is only a tentative start because I have said nothing about Newton’s concept of a “natural power.”

Finally, I am aware that my somewhat Talmudic reading of Newton is not sexy; other commentators will note three omissions: I neither connect my account of Newton’s views to other streams of intellectual thought; nor do I provide Newton with a view that is easily assimilated in our contemporary debates; nor, finally, is my Newton a thoroughgoing theist or Platonizing mystic. But while unfashionable, my Newton is a refined and subtle metaphysician, and entirely sui generis. This is as it should be.

October 18, 2008
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^26	  See Lynn Joy (2006) “Scientific Explanation: From Formal Causes to Laws of Nature”, in: Katharine Park & Lorraine Daston, (eds.), The Cambridge History of Science, Volume 3: Early Modern Science, Cambridge University Press, 70–105 for the importance of Newton’s distinction between active and passive principles.
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^28	  See the 1949 Gagnebin edition of Fatio; cited in Howard Stein (1970) “On the Notion of Field in Newton, Maxwell, and Beyond,” Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science, edited R. H. Stuewer.
^29	  Janiak’s fifth note reads: “See H.W. Turnbull, et al., ed., The Correspondence of Isaac Newton [Correspondence] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959–), vol. 3, 253–54. There is important evidence indicating that this famous passage was not merely the expression of a privately held view, or a public view that Newton later relinquished. The contention that gravity is “essential” to—or “inherent” in—matter is construed here to mean that material objects attract one another at a distance. Newton apparently thinks that if gravity is an essential property of material bodies, two spatially separated and otherwise lonely bodies would each bear the property (i.e., they would bear it in a world empty of other bodies). That entails, in turn, that two otherwise lonely bodies would bear the property in the absence of a medium. And, of course, the view that spatially separated bodies could interact gravitationally in the absence of any medium just is the view that bodies can act on one another at a distance. This identification of the claim that gravity is “essential” to matter with the assertion of distant action is particularly salient because, in an important passage in the Principia, Newton writes: “I am by no means affirming that gravity is essential to bodies . . . Gravity is diminished as bodies recede from the earth” (Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy [Principia], trans. I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999], 796). This passage appears in the last (1726) edition of the text. Since Newton never accepted the view that gravity is “essential” to matter, he apparently never relinquished the contention that distant action between material bodies is impossible.”
^30	  See J.C. Maxwell (1890) The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell edited by W.D. Niven, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 316 & 487. Maxwell appears to be influenced Colin MacLaurin’s account. We can understand Smith’s “History of Astronomy” as an attempted correction to MacLaurin.
^31	  John Henry (1999, 2007, op cit) has made this point forcefully in his papers.
^32	  In private correspondence (4/28/2008), Janiak also cited a passage from Newton’s anonymously published “Account of the Commercium Epistolicum,” where Newton rejects Leibniz’s view of God as “an intelligence above the bounds of the world; whence it seems to follow that he cannot anything within the bounds of the world, unless by an incredible miracle” (Newton 2004, 125). Now it is true that Newton has just affirmed that God is omnipresent. So, a natural reading of the “incredible miracle” that Newton attributes to Leibniz might be that God acts at a distance (for an omnipresent God can always – in Janiak’s terminology -- act locally). The passage would then be very ironic: Leibniz accuses Newton of being committed to action at a distance, and Newton turns the table on Leibniz. But this misunderstands Newton’s point here; if (Leibniz’s) God is above the bounds of the world, this means he is outside of space and time altogether. So, it would not be appropriate at all to say that God is acting a distance; God would literally be acting from nowhere, that is, an incredible miracle. In “De Gravitatione” Newton had claimed “no being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way” (Newton 2004, 25). Thus, in his response to Leibniz, Newton is echoing the doctrine of the sixth chapter of Spinoza’s Theological Political Treatise, where in his discussion of miracles Spinoza rejects the very intelligibility of placing God above the bounds of the world. 
^33	  The discussion below has benefitted from private correspondence with Howard Stein, although the reader should be aware that he objects to my characterization of his position.
^34	  See Howard Stein (1970) “On the Notion of Field in Newton, Maxwell, and Beyond,” Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science.  Reading Ori Belkind (2007) “Newton's Conceptual Argument for Absolute Space” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21(3):  271-293 made me start to question Stein’s use of Definition 8.
^35	  I came to this conclusion before reading David M. Miller's unpublished manuscript, “Qualities, Properties, and Laws in Newton's Method of Induction,” which offers additional arguments for understanding Newton as making claims about systems of bodies. The earliest draft of Rule 3 reads “The laws of all bodies in which experiments can be mare are the laws of bodies universally” quoted in McGuire (1970), op cit, 15. Miller’s position and the view presented in the body of this paper, also fit nicely with Katherine Brading’s (ms) “law-constitutive interpretation of Newton’s analysis of body.”
